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 ABSTRACT 
Incentives and Coordination in Vertically Related Energy Markets*
by Augusto Rupérez Micola, Albert Banal Estañol and Derek W. Bunn 
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market including gas 
shippers, electricity generators and retailers. We show how reward 
interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated 
firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are 
shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals’ costs model. In our case, 
higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets,  which facilitate the 
emergence of financial netback effects. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Anreize und Koordination in vertikal integrierten Energiemärkten 
Es wird ein Agenten-basiertes Modell eines Energiemarktes mit mehreren 
Ebenen der Wertschöpfungskette vorgestellt, das Gaslieferanten, 
Stromerzeuger und Händler berücksichtigt. Es kann gezeigt werden, wie ein 
vertikal integriertes Unternehmen, das auf oligopolistischen Energiemärkten 
agiert, die Honorierungsbeziehungen zwischen strategischen Geschäfts-
bereichen nutzen kann, um seine Gewinne zu steigern. Üblicherweise 
versuchen Firmen, die die gesamte Wertschöpfungskette integriert haben, ihren 
Vorteil dadurch zu nutzen, dass sie die Kosten der Wettbewerber durch 
Preisdiskriminierung erhöhen und den Markt gegen sie abschotten. Das ist in 
Energiemärkten nicht möglich. Im vorgestellten Modell wird ein Mechanismus 
gewählt, der den Charakteristika von Energiemärkten angepasst ist, um über 
Anreize denselben Endeffekt zu erzielen. Dieser beruht aber nicht auf der 
Marktabschottung, sondern auf einem finanziellen Valorisierungseffekt, bei dem 
Unternehmensbereiche am Beginn der Wertschöpfungskette die Preisspannen 
für die Unternehmensteile am oberen Ende vorgeben. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the vertical relationships between gas and electricity markets.
Vertical relationships are those that involve an exchange between sequential
stages of the value chain. In the energy industry, gas is an important input
for electricity generation, and therefore wholesale natural gas and electricity
markets are vertically interrelated. The same is true for wholesale and retail
electricity markets since retailers buy electricity from wholesalers (Stern, 1998).
Vertical interactions may involve separate firms or diﬀerent strategic busi-
ness units (SBUs) within the same firm (Gulati et al., forthcoming). Vertical
integration is widespread among European energy firms. Gas producers often
own gas-fired power plants and many electricity firms consist of generation and
retail SBUs (Midttun and Finon, 2004). Mergers between gas and electricity
firms are relatively new in the United States but they are occurring at a rapid
pace (Hunger, 2003). Moreover, the pace of merger activity appears to be accel-
erating as competition opportunities expand, incentive regulation diﬀuses more
widely, and regulators have become less hostile to mergers (Joskow, 2000).1
Several streams of literature have studied the advantages as well as the dis-
advantages of vertical integration. Industrial economists have long argued that
vertically related firms could strategically benefit from integrating.2 Consider an
intermediate market in which upstream and downstream firms interact. An in-
tegrated firm could gain market share and profits downstream by internalising
production and refusing to sell (or selling at higher prices) to non-integrated
downstream firms. Indeed, the firm’s upstream opponents would then exert
more market power at the margin and increase prices, thereby raising the costs
of non-integrated downstream firms. Higher costs would become a competitive
disadvantage in the downstream market against the vertically integrated firm,
resulting in lost market shares. Trading internalisation would then increase both
upstream and downstream prices and lead to higher integrated firm profits.
Studies of vertical relationships in energy markets (e.g. Granitz and Klein,
1996; Bushnell et al., 2005) often explain their findings using this foreclosure
argument. However, the “raising rivals’ costs” or “foreclosure” logic depends
crucially on the firm’s ability to internalise transactions and / or price discrim-
inate in favour of its downstream SBU. In practice, wholesale energy markets
are often compulsory, so trading internalisation is not feasible. Moreover, the
standard energy market mechanism is the uniform price auction, which seems
to make price diﬀerentiation impossible at the outset. Thus, two of the main
resting points of the raising rivals’ costs logic are often not present in energy
markets.
This paper shows that energy firms may benefit from vertical integration by
1Note that the discussion here is about separation between the buying and selling sides of
the wholesale market and quite diﬀerent from regulatory unbundling of transmission infras-
tructures which is also widespread in the energy industry.
2Management scholars have also identified several motives for firms to integrate vertically
(Harrigan, 1984, 1986), including the reduction of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; Ma-
honey, 1992) and the reduction of corporate risk (Chatterjee et al., 1992).
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using an alternative mechanism to foreclosure. The new mechanism is based on
the presence of vertical incentives, which are widely used within energy firms,
does not require internalisation or price discrimination and can be a way of cir-
cumventing regulatory constraints. One of the main contributions of this paper
is to show that, although the new mechanism yields prices that are superfi-
cially equivalent to those of foreclosure, it operates in a fundamentally diﬀerent
manner.
The general reward system of an organisation plays a major role in the be-
havioural choices of its members. Bonuses tied to overall profits create incentives
for cooperative behaviour both between individuals (Zander and Wolfe, 1964;
Wageman and Baker, 1997) and across departments within a firm (Petersen,
1992; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2004). For individuals, the more interdepen-
dent the task, the more interdependent the reward system should be (Wageman
and Baker, 1997) because it results in a positive relationship between eﬀective-
ness of the integrative devices and organisational performance (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967). For firms, the importance of cooperation between SBUs grows
with their interdependence (Gulati and Singh, 1998) and the higher the inter-
unit synergies, the more useful are the collaborative incentives (Kretschmer and
Puranam, 2004). Collaborative incentives, however, not only encourage coop-
eration but may also enhance free riding. Indeed, rewards based on aggregate
profits hinder the identification of individual performances. As a consequence,
individuals have more incentives to shirk hoping that the others will compensate
(Holmstrom, 1982; Petersen, 1992).3
Despite the importance of collaborative incentives, the existing literature
provides no guidance as to how they should be given to sequential SBUs in
vertically integrated energy firms. In order to fill this gap, we consider a setting
consisting of three sequential, multiple-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auctions
representing a wholesale gas market, a wholesale electricity market and a retail
electricity market. Although quite realistic, this complex trading environment
presents a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr and
Harbord, 1993). To achieve predictions, we adopt an inductive selection method
based on the adaptive theory of reinforcement learning put forward by Roth and
Erev (1995).
The agent-based simulations show that coordination overcomes the poten-
tial disadvantages of broad collaborative incentives due to the large interdepen-
dences between energy markets. More importantly, our results uncover a simple
but powerful mechanism to exert vertical market power. Using collaborative
incentives that link the reward to the performance of the diﬀerent SBUs, verti-
cally integrated firms achieve higher prices and higher profit. These observable
outcomes are consistent with the foreclosure argument. Closer inspection, how-
ever, reveals that the downstream SBU behaves less competitively, increasing
downstream prices instead of taking advantage of the rivals’ higher costs. More-
over, the upstream SBU behaves more competitively and takes advantage of the
3Broad incentives could also obstruct learning since it is more diﬃcult to identify the most
successful business strategies.
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higher downstream prices. Rather than foreclosure, the results are due to a
financial netback eﬀect connecting the diﬀerent markets in which downstream
prices set the scope for the level of upstream prices.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the
agent-based simulation model; Section 3 presents the results, which are extended
in Section 4; and a short discussion follows in Section 5.
2 The Computational Model
2.1 General Setting
The model incorporates key features of electricity and gas markets in the short-
run. Consider three sequential, oligopolistic energy markets, a wholesale gas
market, a wholesale electricity market and a retail electricity market. Gas sold
in the wholesale gas market is an input for the generation of the electricity
traded in the wholesale electricity market that, in turn, is sold to end users in
the retail market. In the gas market, there are A upstream natural gas shippers
that sell gas to B electricity generators. These generators buy gas to produce
electricity and sell it in the electricity market to C electricity retailers. These, in
turn, re-sell the electricity in the end-user market.4 Marginal costs are assumed
to be constant throughout and normalised to 0 for simplicity. There are no
transmission constraints or storage.
Firms are capacity constrained and total capacity is equal across tiers. More-
over, firms in each tier are identical. If one denotes market capacity as Km, the
individual capacity of a gas shipper is Kg = KmA , that of an electricity generator
is Ke = KmB and that of an electricity retailer is Kr =
Km
C .
2.2 Market Rules
Goods are traded repeatedly along the value chain (Figure 1). In a given round
t, three uniform price auctions take place sequentially, at the retail, wholesale
electricity and wholesale gas levels. In each market i, i ∈ {r, e, g}, trading occurs
as follows. Suppliers simultaneously submit single price bids at which they are
willing to sell (up to) their capacity, starting from 0 and up to P i(t), a maximum
level for each market that will be explained below. An independent auctioneer
determines a uniform market price (P i(t)) by intersecting the ad hoc supply
function with the corresponding inelastic demand curve, Qi(t). The independent
auctioneer assigns full capacity, qij(t) = Ki, to the m sellers that submitted bids
below the market price; the remaining capacity, qij(t) = Qi(t) − mKi, to the
seller that submitted a bid equal to the market price;5 and zero sales, qij(t) = 0,
to the sellers that submitted bids above the market price. The market price and
the individual quantities are then communicated independently to each supplier.
4Although relevant in the medium term, we do not deal with entry and exit of firms,
variation in end-user demand or capacity expansion.
5 In case of a tie, the selling firm is selected randomly.
3
Pr
Retail 
Electricity Market
Qr
Demand
Supply
Ψ
Pe
Qe = Qr
Wholesale 
Electricity Market
Pg
Qg = Qe = Qr
Wholesale 
Gas Market
Figure 1: Sequential Clearing of the Market Simulation
At the retail level, the inelastic market demand Qr(t) is drawn, indepen-
dently in each round, from a uniform distribution in [Q¯r − ε, Q¯r + ε], where
Q¯r is the expected end-user demand and ε accounts for the small uncertainty
typical in day-ahead electricity forecasting.6 Possible retail prices are bounded
in (0,Ψ], with Ψ being the maximum reasonable end-user price and therefore
P r(t) = Ψ.7 Retail commitments are honoured with purchases in the wholesale
electricity market. The retailers’ aggregated demand curve in the wholesale
electricity market is therefore equal to the market demand at the retail level if
the price is below the retail market price, Qe(t) = Qr(t) if P e(t) ≤ P r(t), and
zero otherwise, Qe(t) = 0 if P e(t) > P r(t). Accordingly, electricity generators
submit bids bounded between (0, P r(t)] and therefore P e(t) = P r(t). The gen-
erators’ aggregated demand curve in the wholesale gas market is equal to the
market demand at the retail level if the price is below the wholesale electricity
market price, Qg(t) = Qr(t) if P g(t) ≤ P e(t), and zero otherwise, Qg(t) = 0
if P g(t) > P e(t). Gas shippers submit bids bounded between (0, P e(t)] and
therefore P g(t) = P e(t).
By construction, the end-user market demand in each round t determines
the volumes traded in the wholesale markets,
Qg(t) = Qe(t) = Qr(t).
Moreover, the three prices are vertically related,
P g(t) ≤ P e(t) ≤ P r(t).
6 Similarly to real electricity markets, the model also includes some excess capacity, i.e.
Q¯r + ε < Km.
7This upper price ceiling can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or
the cost of alternative, expensive, peaking load fuels to which the system administrator could
switch at short notice if gas prices exceed Ψ.
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Profits for each firm type are
πga(t) = P g(t) qga(t) for a = 1...A (1)
πeb(t) = [P e(t)− P g(t)] qeb(t) for b = 1...B (2)
πrc(t) = [P r(t)− P e(t)] qrc (t) for c = 1...C. (3)
There are apparently no other multi-tier simulations driven by netback prin-
ciples in the energy modelling literature. This new method is the paper’s main
methodological contribution.
2.3 Vertical Integration and Reward Interdependence
In the basic model, it is assumed that a shipper (without loss of generality,
a = 1) and a generator (b = 1) are vertically integrated in that they belong to
the same organisational structure, i.e. the same firm. Trading is compulsory and
firms are not allowed to price discriminate. However, the vertically integrated
firm can influence its traders’ decisions by giving them incentives that depend
on the profits of their own unit but also on the other unit,
Ωg1(t) = (1− α)π
g
1(t) + απe1(t) and (4)
Ωe1(t) = (1− α)πe1(t) + απ
g
1(t), (5)
where α = {0, .01, .02, ..., .5} parameterises the “reward interdependence” (Wage-
man and Baker, 1997) between the two vertically related SBUs. A small α
represents narrow incentives, which become broader for growing α. Note that
for α = 0, Ωg1(t) = π
g
1(t) and Ωe1(t) = πe1(t), and SBUs trade as if they were
independent. For tractability and realism, the model is restricted to the case in
which SBUs are rewarded predominantly on the basis of their own performance,
i.e. α ≤ 0.5.
Managers in the non-integrated firms do not have reward interdependences
so their incentives are correlated to their own unit performance,
Ωij(t) = πij(t) for either i = {g, e} and j 6= 1 or i = r and any j. (6)
2.4 Bidding and Behavioural Learning
The feasible price oﬀer domain for each firm is approximated by a discrete
grid consisting of a fixed number of possible actions (independent of t). In
each trading period, suppliers choose among Si possible prices, equally spaced
between the minimum and the maximum reasonable price oﬀer, (0, P i(t)], where
P r(t) = Ψ, P e(t) = P r(t) and P g(t) = P e(t). Hence, the set of possible actions,
Ai at a tier i in a period t is given by
Ai(t) = s ∗
Ã
P i(t)
Si
!
for s = 1, ..., Si. (7)
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Notice that in the wholesale markets, the sets of possible prices change over
time. In all markets, actions with a lower s are more competitive or closer to
the marginal costs.
Each trader plays each possible action with a given likelihood or “propen-
sity”, rij,s. The probability that an agent j plays an action s is given by its
propensity divided by the sum of the propensities of all possible actions,
pij,s(t) =
rij,s(t)PSi
s=1 rij,s(t)
. (8)
Propensities for all actions are initialised to the firms’ maximum profit, i.e.
rij,s(1) = ΨKi for all s, so that all actions have the same initial probability,
pij,s(1) = 1Si for all s and i.
At the end of each round, traders reinforce the selected action, k, through
an increase in its propensity equivalent to the performance, Ωij(t). Moreover,
actions that are similar, i.e. k−1 and k+1, are also reinforced, by Ωij(t)∗(1−δ)
where 0 < δ < 1 (“persistent local experimentation” in the terminology of Roth
and Erev). All propensities are discounted by γ (“gradual forgetting”) and
actions whose probability falls below a certain threshold are removed from the
space of choice (“extinction in finite time”). Summarising, the pre-extinction
propensities ri0j,s are
ri0j,s(t) =



(1− γ)rij,s(t− 1) +Ωij(t) if s = k
(1− γ)rij,s(t− 1) + (1− δ) Ωij(t) if s = k − 1 or s = k + 1
(1− γ)rij,s(t− 1) if s 6= k − 1, s 6= k and s 6= k + 1
(9)
and the final propensities, corrected by the extinction feature, are
rij,s(t) = ri0j,s(t)I{ r
i0
j,s(t)PSi
s=1 r
i0
j,s(t)
>µ}
(10)
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition between
brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise.
2.5 Simulation Parameters
In the first instance, industry structure is simplified to consist of two gas ship-
pers, three generators and four retailers (i.e. A = 2; B = 3; C = 4). Gas
shippers will be referred to as G1 and G2, generators as E1, E2 and E3 and
retailers as R1, R2, R3 and R4. As mentioned above, in the base case, the two
vertically integrated entities are G1 and E1. Total capacity is set to Km = 300,
so that the individual capacity of a gas shipper is Kg = 150, of an electricity
generator is Ke = 100 and of an electricity retailer is Kr = 75. Expected market
demand is Q¯r = 240 and ε = 5, so that there is an expected excess capacity of
20% with about 5% uncertainty in the day-ahead forecasted demand, approxi-
mately of the magnitude observed in energy markets. The end-user reasonable
price ceiling is set at Ψ = 200.
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Fifty-one reward interdependence cases α = {0, .01, .02, .03, ..., .50} are stud-
ied and 50 simulation runs consisting of 500 periods were carried out for each
of them. The data presented consists of averages for the last 200 periods, for
each run and each case. These represent long term stationary values8 to which
the three markets converge, based on the R&E reinforcement parameters.9
3 Results
3.1 Market Prices and Profits
Figures 2, 3 and 4 report the 95% mean confidence intervals of simulated prices
in the three sequential markets when G1 and E1 are vertically integrated. They
present the relationship between reward interdependence α (on the horizontal
axis) and P g, P e and P r (on the vertical axis), respectively. As shown by
Figure 2, shippers coordinate on higher prices as α grows. The lack of reward
interdependences (α = 0) results in an average gas price of approximately 59
monetary units, which increases to about 63 units for α = .50. Figure 3 shows
that wholesale electricity prices are also clearly influenced by α. When α = 0,
the simulation produces an average price of about 83 units, for α = .50 it is
about 93. Finally, Figure 4 presents retail price levels not varying systematically
as a function of α. The structure of incentives in the vertically integrated firm
does not influence P r.
By construction, the expected absolute size of the resource rent shared by
the three market tiers is constant (= ΨQ¯r). What changes is the proportion
accruing to each of them. Increasing P g with constant production costs results
in a higher proportion of the rent staying with the gas duopoly. Taking Figures
2, 3 and 4 together, P e increases compensate to some extent the higher P g, but
that is not the case for P r. Market prices seem to indicate that generators and,
particularly, retailers are subject to shippers foreclosure emerging from reward
interdependences between G1 and E1.
Moreover, α influences both the profits of the vertically integrated firm and
its two SBUs (Figure 5). Broader vertical incentives increase the G1’s profit
but decrease those of E1. The resulting overall corporate profit (πg1 + πe1) is
clearly increasing from about 9,000 monetary units to over 10,000. Thus, there
is a positive relationship between vertical reward interdependence across the
two strategic business units, the firm’s overall profit and the concentration of
profit upstream.
3.2 Price-setting Behaviour
In a uniform price auction, prices are determined by the last bid on the merit
order, and therefore being a marginal seller is a necessary condition to influ-
ence prices. Hence, the frequency with which each firm takes the marginal
8Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) reject the null unit root hypotheses with p < .01.
9The R&E parameters used throughout are γ = 0.01, δ = 0.5 and µ = 0.0005.
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Figure 2: Natural Gas Prices Figure 3: Wholesale Electricity Prices
Figure 5: Profit, Vertically Integrated FirmFigure 4: Retail Electricity Prices
Figure 2: Natural Gas Prices; Figure 3: Wholesale Electricity Prices;
Figure 4: Retail Electricity Prices, Figure 5: Profit, Vertically Integrated Firm.
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price-setting position on the supply merit order represents one dimension of its
predisposition to exert market power (at the expense of market share). The
raising rivals’ cost logic would require G1 to concede market power upstream
and E1 to undercut their rivals downstream. Following that argument, G1 and
E1 should be setting prices less often for a higher α.
The vertical axes in Figures 6 and 7, provide averages over the frequencies
with which each market player sets the price in the 200 end-of-simulation periods
averaged across the 50 simulation runs. An increase in the reward interdepen-
dence between G1 and E1 creates two simultaneous eﬀects. On the one hand,
the proportion of trading periods in which G1 sets prices goes down from about
50% when α = 0 to around 41%, when α = 0.5 (Figure 6). Consistent with the
foreclosure predictions, reward interdependence provides incentives for the G1
to influence P g less often at the benefit of G2.
On the other hand, the proportion of trading periods in which E1 is price-
setting increases from 33% when α = 0 to about 50% for α = 0.5 (Figure
7). Hence there is a positive relationship between α and E1’s predisposition to
exert market power, which is at odds with the foreclosure prediction. Since E1
bidding behaviour results in lower profits downstream but higher overall profits,
there is an alternative mechanism to foreclosure that, operating via α, links E1’s
behaviour to the overall firm profit.
3.3 Latent Intensity of Competition
Figures 8 and 9 characterise the Si end-of-simulation individual latent probabil-
ity distributions from which agents choose. The concentration of probabilities is
largely invariant across a large number of periods once the market reaches con-
vergence, so the distributions at t = 500 are an indication of the firms’ long-term
mixed strategies.
On the horizontal axes, strategies are identified with numbers ranging from
1 for the more competitive to 100 for the highest possible bid. Cumulative prob-
abilities for the three tiers are calculated on the vertical axes for each element of
the strategy space. The curves summarise the cumulative bidding probabilities
for α = 0 and α = 0.5, averaged across the 50 simulation runs. In all cases,
probabilities concentrated on lower (higher) strategies result on the agents be-
having more (less) competitively. That is, curve movements to the “Northwest
- NW” and “Southeast - SE” are indications of more and less competition, re-
spectively. The figures oﬀer a number of insights linking individual probability
distributions to market outcomes:
(a) The shippers’ distribution are very similar under α = 0 but become
diﬀerent under α = 0.5 (Figure 8). Reward interdependence incentives in the
vertically integrated firm have the eﬀect of making G1 bids more competitive
(NW movement). Moreover, G2’s prior is slightly less competitive (movement to
SE). Gas firms behave as predicted by the foreclosure argument and concentrate
market power on G2.
(b) Probability distributions on the generator side are similar for all firms
under α = 0 (Figure 9). However, when α = 0.5, E1 tends to exert more
9
Figure 6: Shippers’ Price-setting Frequencies Figure 7: Generators’ Price-setting Frequencies
Figure 9: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of GeneratorsFigure 8: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Shippers
Figure 3: Shippers’ Price-setting Frequencies, Figure 7: Generators’ Price-
setting Frequencies; Figure 8: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of
Shippers; Figure 9: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Generators.
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market power than that of its competitors, E2 and E3 (movement to the SE).
This does not fit into the raising rivals’ costs logic and suggests that the coor-
dination mechanism is driven by reward interdependences and the ability of the
generating SBU to benefit from higher natural gas prices.
3.4 Firm Learning, Behaviour and Market Outcomes
Through their dynamic trading interaction, firms learn to prioritise those bid-
ding strategies that achieve higher payoﬀs and choose them more often. Each
firm’s price setting frequency is related to that prioritisation of the strategies
and, once marginal supply and demand patterns are established, price regu-
larities follow. The results suggest a link between α, firm learning, trading
behaviour and market outcomes.
As α increases, E1 sets P e more often and manages to increase it markedly.
Being at the margin more often is clearly at the expense of market share, re-
ducing πe1. However, due to the netback market clearing procedure, a higher
P e provides more scope for higher P g’s. G1 then lets G2 exert more market
power and increase P g. G1, on the other hand, trades on the base-load more
often, increasing its market share and profitability. The rise in upstream profits
compensates the losses downstream and therefore πg1 + πe1 increase.
The simulations’ logic is therefore quite diﬀerent from foreclosure. The ver-
tically integrated firm learns to gain market share in the upstream market and
gives up market share downstream in exchange for higher P e. The identification
of this mechanism relating the market clearing sequence to vertical coordina-
tion via broad reward interdependences is this paper’s main economic policy
contribution.
4 Extensions
This section checks whether the results depend on the position of the vertically
integrated SBUs in the value chain and on the market concentration levels.
4.1 Alternative Positions of the Vertically Integrated Firm
New simulations analyse reward interdependences between G1 and R1 plus those
between E1 and R1, keeping all other parameters constant. Table 1 and Figures
10 and 11 summarise results for α = 0 and α = .5 in these new simulations.
Two interesting findings emerge from the simulated consequences of a merger
between a natural gas shipper and a retailer, complementing and extending the
previous results. First, retail prices, P r, increase from an average of 124 for α =
0 to 144 when α = .5 (+16.12%), compared to a negligible change when there is a
merger between a shipper and a generator (+0.88%). Reward interdependence
with G1 induces R1 to implement a less competitive—mixed strategy through
which the firm becomes price setting more often with P r increasing steadily.
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Figure 12: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies Shippers and of Generators for a Symmetric Market Structure
Figure 10: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Shippers and Retailers in the Shipper-Retailer Merging Case
Figure 11: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Generators and Retailers in the Generator-Retailer Merging case
Figure 4: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Shippers and Retailers
in the Shipper-Retailer Merging Case; Figure 11: End of Simulation Distribu-
tion of Strategies of Generators and Retailers in the Shipper-Retailer Merging
Case; Figure 12: End of Simulation Distribution of Strategies of Shippers and
Generators for a Symmetric Market Structure.
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Pg Pe Pr
Separation (α = 0) 59 83 124
Shipper-Generator (α = .5) 63 93 125
+6.77% +12.04% +0.88%
Shipper-Retailer (α = .5) 67 95 144
+15% +14.45% +16.12%
Generator-Retailer (α = .5) 63 88 136
+6.77% +6.02% +9.67%
Table 1: Average Prices, A=2; B =3; C=4
Pg Pe Pr
Separation (α = 0) 71 100 143
Shipper-Generator (α = .5) 73 108 143
+2.81% +8% 0%
Table 2: Average Prices, A=B=C=2.
The second result is that wholesale prices also increase. The P r eﬀect moves
up in the value chain. It translates into higher P e and P g from about 83 to
95 (+14.45%) and 59 to 67 (+15%), respectively. Reward interdependences
hurt end users in this case. Although the E1, E2, E3 probability priors and
trading behaviour change little, G1 becomes more competitive and facilitates
the exertion of G2 market power (Figure 10). That eﬀect results in a P e − P g
diﬀerence similar to the initial case. Moreover, by construction, higher P r
widens the [0, P r] range within which P e is determined. With a constant number
of bidding strategies, Si, similar generators’ probability distributions result in
higher P e as P r increases.
The simulations assuming integration between E1 and R1 show increases in
P e (+6.02%) and P r (+9.67). R1 manages to leverage its overall revenue and
implement a more collusive mixed strategy that expands the base for higher
P e. E1, on the other hand, bids more often on the base part of the load curve
— more competitively. That results in E2 and E3 setting (higher) P e (Figure
11). It is interesting to note how the non-integrated G1 and G2 capture a large
proportion of that rent through a P g increase of 6.77%.
4.2 Symmetric Market Structure Across Tiers
In the analysis above, market structure remained invariable and progressively
less concentrated (A = 2; B = 3; C = 4). The vertical foreclosure literature
suggests that higher upstream concentration is an important element of the
firms’ ability to exert vertical market power. This conclusion is checked by
simulating a market structure symmetric across tiers.
Table 2 summarises market prices for A = B = C = 2. Vertical inte-
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gration between a shipper and a generator leads, as in the asymmetric case,
to higher wholesale electricity and natural gas prices but not higher end user
prices. Higher prices with increasing α, therefore, hinge on the market clearing
sequence rather than on market structure asymmetries.
The panels in Figure 12 present the strategy cumulative probability distribu-
tions in this setting. The left hand side panel shows the probability distribution
for the vertically integrated firm’s upstream SBUs moving to the NW when α
changes from α = 0 to α = .5, complemented again by the independent firm’s
SE movement. The right hand side panel oﬀers evidence of the downstream
firm positioning itself so as to set higher prices when α = .5. While there is no
variation in the independent firm’s bidding strategies, the vertically integrated
firm’s cumulative probability distribution moves to the SE.
These results strengthen the chapter’s main insight of higher prices emerg-
ing through market sequence coordination, rather than via the foreclosure logic.
They also suggest that market structure asymmetries are not a necessary con-
dition for the mechanism to operate.10
5 Discussion
The existence of interdependences between vertically related SBUs has become
a bedrock in the business strategy literature, yet we know relatively little about
the underlying forces that create these interdependences and their eﬀects. A set
of agent-based simulations identifies one such eﬀect in the de-regulated energy
industry. Reward interdependences between SBUs lead to trading coordination
and higher prices. Under tight reward interdependence structures, vertically
integrated firms give up profits downstream in order to increase the scope for
upstream profits. This leads to strategic behaviour that superficially has the
appearance of foreclosure but that is based on a quite diﬀerent principle. This
paper adds to the preceding literature in at least three ways.
On the methodological side, there are apparently no other multi-tier energy
simulations driven by netback principles in the literature. Industry wisdom
suggests that this type of market clearing characterises better the reciprocal
relationships between electricity and gas prices than conventional supply chain
models.
The second contribution relates to the literature on the sources of verti-
cal market power in the energy industry (e.g. Bushnell et al., 2005; Granitz
and Klein, 1996; Kühn and Machado, 2004). The financial dependence be-
tween electricity and natural gas markets is not captured in the foreclosure
argument, where causal pricing relationships are sequential from the upstream
to the downstream segment. The simulations unveil a new mechanism that
suggests a solution to the puzzle of how vertical market power is observed in
some energy markets where it should not really appear. Netback, i.e. “spark
spread”, pricing means that wholesale gas and electricity prices are determined
10Results under symmetrical A = B = C = 3 and A = B = C = 4 assumptions were
qualitatively equivalent to those of A = B = C = 2.
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in a down-to-upstream sequence. Hence, vertical market power can occur in
compulsory, uniform price auction, without trading internalisation and price
discrimination.
Thirdly, the research identifies a link between internal incentive structures,
SBU behaviour and firm performance. Reward interdependence has been shown
to be an instrument leading to market power, via higher vertical SBU coor-
dination. Ways in which reward interdependences can be articulated include
direct bonuses and stock options, and casual evidence indicates that these are
widespread in the energy industry. It is interesting to note that such reward
interdependence contracts are internal to the firm and, hence, normally fall out-
side the scope for regulatory intervention. Whether firms use them explicitly as
a way of aligning their interests to those of their SBU employees is an interesting
question for future empirical work.
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